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  12	   ABSTRACT	  13	   Experimental	  studies	  on	  punishment	  have	  sometimes	  been	  overinterpreted	  not	  only	  for	  14	   the	  reasons	  Guala	  lists	  but	  also	  because	  of	  a	  frequent	  conflation	  of	  proximate	  and	  15	   ultimate	  explanatory	  levels	  that	  Guala’s	  review	  perpetuates.	  Moreover,	  for	  future	  16	   analyses	  we	  may	  need	  a	  clearer	  classification	  of	  different	  kinds	  of	  punishment.	  17	   	  18	   When	  explaining	  behavioral	  decisions,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  distinguish	  between	  different	  19	   explanatory	  levels,	  especially	  between	  proximate	  (mechanistic)	  and	  ultimate	  20	   (evolutionary)	  explanations	  (Tinbergen,	  1963).	  Proximate	  explanations	  of	  a	  given	  21	   behavior	  deal	  with	  questions	  about	  its	  ontogeny	  (e.g.	  how	  does	  the	  behavior	  change	  22	   with	  age	  and	  experience)	  or	  about	  its	  causation,	  i.e.	  the	  physiological,	  molecular,	  and	  23	   cognitive	  mechanisms	  underlying	  the	  behavior	  and	  the	  stimuli	  that	  elicit	  it.	  Ultimate	  24	   explanations	  either	  deal	  with	  questions	  about	  the	  phylogeny	  of	  the	  behavior	  (e.g.	  how	  25	   does	  it	  compare	  with	  similar	  behaviors	  in	  related	  species)	  or	  its	  adaptive	  value	  (e.g.	  26	   what	  is	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  individual’s	  survival	  and	  life-­‐‑time	  reproductive	  success).	  	  27	   The	  concept	  of	  weak	  reciprocity,	  as	  defined	  in	  Guala	  (2011),	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  28	   explain	  the	  adaptive	  value	  of	  cooperation	  and	  punishment	  because	  it	  concentrates	  on	  29	   the	  fitness	  benefits	  one	  could	  get	  from	  cooperating,	  defecting,	  or	  punishing	  (Trivers,	  30	   1971;	  Alexander,	  1974).	  This	  concept	  is	  restricted	  to	  one	  explanatory	  level	  only.	  In	  31	   contrast,	  strong	  reciprocity	  mixes	  different	  explanatory	  levels:	  it	  uses	  proximate	  32	   arguments	  to	  explain	  ultimate	  problems	  (Fehr	  &	  Gächter,	  2002;	  Fehr	  &	  Fischbacher,	  33	   2003,	  2004;	  Fehr	  &	  Rockenbach,	  2003;	  Gintis	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  Bowles	  &	  Gintis,	  2004).	  Strong	  34	   reciprocity	  is,	  for	  example,	  called	  a	  “…	  predisposition	  to	  reward	  others	  for	  cooperative,	  35	   norm-­‐‑abiding	  behaviours”	  and	  “…	  a	  propensity	  to	  impose	  sanctions	  on	  others	  for	  norm	  36	   violations”	  (Fehr	  &	  Fischbacher,	  2003,	  p.	  785).	  Such	  a	  definition	  clearly	  relates	  to	  the	  37	   causal	  mechanisms	  of	  cooperation	  and	  punishment.	  But	  the	  concept	  is	  then	  frequently	  38	   used	  as	  to	  answer	  ultimate	  (evolutionary)	  questions,	  for	  example	  in	  Bowles	  &	  Gintis	  39	   (2004,	  p.17):“…	  cooperation	  is	  maintained	  because	  many	  humans	  have	  a	  predisposition	  40	   to	  punish	  those	  who	  violate	  group-­‐‑beneficial	  norms”.	  Such	  a	  mixing	  up	  of	  different	  41	   explanatory	  levels	  can,	  from	  an	  evolutionary	  point	  of	  view,	  easily	  lead	  to	  42	   overinterpretations	  of	  proximate	  patterns	  (Hagen	  &	  Hammerstein,	  2006;	  Sigmund,	  43	   2007;	  West	  et	  al.,	  2007,	  in	  press;	  Rankin	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  For	  example,	  punishment	  that	  can	  44	   be	  observed	  in	  anonymous	  one-­‐‑shot	  interactions	  seems	  truly	  altruistic	  and	  was	  45	   interpreted	  as	  such	  in	  Fehr	  &	  Gächter	  (2002).	  However,	  until	  very	  recently,	  humans	  46	   lived	  in	  groups	  where	  anonymous	  one-­‐‑shot	  interactions	  were	  probably	  very	  rare,	  i.e.	  47	   such	  interactions	  are	  most	  probably	  not	  the	  context	  in	  which	  human	  punishment	  has	  48	  
	   2	  
evolved.	  If	  studied	  within	  a	  more	  natural	  social	  context,	  human	  punishment	  may	  49	   ultimately	  be	  self-­‐‑interested.	  50	   	   As	  discussed	  in	  Guala	  (2011),	  explaining	  punishment	  from	  an	  evolutionary	  point	  51	   of	  view	  requires	  determining	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  punishment.	  In	  line	  with	  weak	  52	   reciprocity	  models,	  recent	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  punishment	  can	  lead	  to	  long-­‐‑term	  53	   net	  benefits	  and	  hence	  be	  evolutionarily	  stable	  when	  punitive	  actions	  contribute	  to	  a	  54	   punishment	  reputation	  (Hilbe	  &	  Sigmund,	  2010;	  dos	  Santos	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  Under	  such	  55	   conditions,	  the	  immediate	  costs	  of	  punishment	  can	  be	  outweighed	  by	  the	  benefits	  a	  56	   punisher	  receives	  later	  because	  of	  his/her	  punishment	  reputation.	  Experimental	  studies	  57	   that	  ignore	  the	  possible	  effects	  of	  a	  punishment	  reputation	  can	  therefore	  easily	  produce	  58	   artifacts	  (Hagen	  &	  Hammerstein,	  2006).	  59	   	   We	  also	  believe	  that	  the	  term	  “punishment”	  is	  currently	  used	  too	  broadly	  in	  the	  60	   literature	  on	  cooperation.	  If	  “punishment”	  is	  the	  subtraction	  of	  resources	  from	  free-­‐‑61	   riders	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  frequency	  of	  further	  free-­‐‑riding,	  there	  are	  at	  least	  three	  62	   different	  kinds	  of	  punishment	  that	  may	  need	  to	  be	  distinguished	  both	  for	  ultimate	  and	  63	   proximate	  analyses.	  Many	  of	  these	  analyses	  deal	  with	  what	  could	  be	  called	  “simple	  64	   costly	  punishment”,	  i.e.	  punishers	  pay	  a	  cost	  to	  induce	  a	  cost	  on	  the	  punished	  (Fehr	  &	  65	   Gächter,	  2000;	  Rockenbach	  &	  Milinski,	  2006;	  Dreber	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Rand	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Wu	  et	  66	   al.,	  2009).	  Another	  form	  of	  punishment	  could	  be	  called	  “punishment	  by	  taking	  67	   something	  away”	  (e.g.	  Cephu’s	  example	  in	  Guala,	  2011).	  Here,	  the	  punisher	  takes	  68	   something	  from	  the	  punished	  in	  order	  to	  induce	  a	  cost	  to	  the	  punished.	  Regardless	  of	  69	   whether	  the	  punisher	  thereby	  experiences	  an	  immediate	  reduction	  of	  the	  own	  welfare	  70	   or	  not,	  “punishment	  by	  taking	  something	  away”	  and	  the	  upper	  “simple	  costly	  71	   punishment”	  are	  likely	  to	  differ	  in	  their	  cost-­‐‑benefit	  ratios	  (relevant	  for	  ultimate	  72	   analyses)	  and	  may	  involve,	  for	  example,	  different	  kinds	  of	  emotions	  (relevant	  for	  73	   proximate	  analyses).	  A	  third	  category	  could	  be	  called	  “punishment	  by	  refusal”.	  The	  74	   punisher	  then	  punishes	  by	  refusing	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  punished	  in	  a	  repeated	  game	  75	   like,	  for	  example,	  an	  iterated	  Prisoner’s	  Dilemma	  (Fudenberg	  et	  al.,	  1994).	  The	  examples	  76	   of	  ostracism	  discussed	  in	  Guala	  relate	  to	  this	  kind	  of	  punishment.	  Such	  defection	  may	  77	   typically	  be	  a	  reaction	  to	  non-­‐‑provoked	  defection	  and	  could	  be	  called	  “punishment”	  if	  it	  78	   reduces	  the	  income	  of	  the	  punished	  (i.e.	  his/her	  benefits	  from	  what	  would	  otherwise	  be	  79	   cooperative	  interactions)	  in	  order	  to	  possibly	  improve	  the	  punisher’s	  long-­‐‑term	  benefits	  80	   from	  future	  cooperative	  interactions	  with	  a	  refined	  punished	  or	  with	  others.	  This	  third	  81	   kind	  of	  punishment	  could	  be	  immediately	  costly	  for	  the	  punisher,	  for	  example,	  if	  it	  82	   delays	  the	  resumption	  of	  beneficial	  mutual	  cooperation.	  Such	  immediate	  costs	  would	  83	   have	  to	  be	  compensated	  on	  the	  long	  run	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  “punishment	  by	  refusal”	  as	  84	   an	  evolutionary	  successful	  behavioral	  strategy.	  However,	  a	  possible	  alternative	  function	  85	   of	  defection	  in	  response	  to	  defection	  may	  be	  to	  simply	  avoid	  the	  losses	  of	  anticipated	  86	   further	  defection	  (e.g.	  avoiding	  the	  sucker’s	  payoff	  in	  the	  Prisoner’s	  Dilemma).	  It	  is	  87	   probably	  not	  useful	  to	  call	  this	  later	  form	  of	  defection	  “punishment”	  if	  it	  usually	  does	  not	  88	   ultimately	  increase	  the	  level	  of	  cooperation	  within	  a	  group	  or	  directly	  with	  the	  defector	  89	   (from	  an	  ultimate	  point	  of	  view),	  or	  if	  it	  is	  just	  a	  precautionary	  measure	  to	  avoid	  further	  90	   losses	  (from	  a	  proximate	  point	  of	  view).	  Therefore,	  purely	  punitive	  actions	  may	  not	  91	   always	  be	  easy	  to	  identify.	  Multidisciplinary	  approaches	  that	  carefully	  exploit	  the	  92	   specific	  advantages	  of	  proximate	  and	  ultimate	  analyses	  are	  therefore	  often	  necessary	  to	  93	   better	  understand	  human	  behavior.	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